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1 Introduction
Conict may lead to resource wasteful ghting even in situations in which conict
could be avoided and a peaceful sharing agreement could be reached. The failure to
avoid wasteful conict is a puzzle that attracted much attention and led to a num-
ber of rational choice explanations for wasteful ghting, for instance, in international
politics. Work in this eld has used concepts of game theory to address the role
of incomplete information about the rivals strength or ghting ability or the rivals
valuation of what can be allocated or shared between the contestants1, indivisibili-
ties of what can be re-allocated between rivals2, the relationship of domestic politics
and international conict3, the lack of peaceful coalition outcomes4, the inability to
solve conict by a cooperative bargaining outcome due to time consistency issues and
the lack of complete contracts5, and the role of multiple equilibria and equilibrium
selection6 ;7. Moreover, there has been a discussion about the relationship between
the distribution of power and the likelihood of conict. For instance, Organski (1968;
p.294) argues that a balance of power makes war more likely because "nations are
reluctant to ght unless they believe they have a good chance of winning, but this is
true for both sides only when the two are fairly evenly matched, or at least when they
believe they are". Claude (1962; pp.51-66) views a balance of power as a state of equi-
librium and concludes that is has "the compensatory advantage of not assigning any
group of states to a position of decided inferiority in the quest for security". Wittman
(1979) argues that there is no e¤ect of the power distribution on the likelihood of war
because inequality in military power may be counterbalanced by unequal sharing in
1See, for instance, Brito and Intriligator (1985), Powell (1987, 1988), Morrow (1989), Fearon
(1995) and Bueno De Mesquita, Morrow and Zorick (1997) for results and discussion, and more
recently Slantchev (2010) on the problem of countervailing signaling incentives and Slantchev and
Tarar (2011) on a rationalist theory of mutual optimism.
2See Hassner (2003) and Hensel and McLaughlin Mitchell (2005), and Powell (2006) for a discus-
sion.
3See Hess and Orphanides (1995) and Jackson and Morelli (2007) for two di¤erent approaches to
this issue.
4See, e.g., Jordan (2006) for an analysis of possible coalition outcomes as a function of the
distribution of power in pillage games.
5See, e.g., Fearon (1996), Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000), and Powell (2006) and McBride and
Skaperdas (2009) for empirical evidence in a conict experiment.
6Slantchev (2003) and Konrad and Leininger (2011).
7Jackson and Morelli (2011) provide an overview and discuss further issues including rst-strike
advantages, the role of political regime, and behavioral aspects such as ideology or revenge.
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a peaceful bargaining outcome.8
This paper explores a potential reason for why ghting may occur more frequently
than what would be expected from this set of explanations. We focus on the generic
problem of bargaining about a peaceful settlement in the shadow of war. We abstract
from many aspects that have been highlighted in the theories mentioned above and
analyze a simple bargaining context in which players face a given peaceful negotiation
outcome as a take-it-or-leave-it alternative. Players may either accept this outcome
or they may ght with each other. The important novel aspect which we take into
consideration, however, is a di¤erent rule by which players decide about whether or
not to accept a peaceful settlement in the shadow of war: we consider a decision
rule that is shaped by an evolutionary process. Forces of mutation and selection lead
to evolutionarily stable decision rules. Our main question is whether evolutionarily
stable decision making yields more or less ghting than in a Nash equilibrium, and
whether it makes peaceful settlement more or less likely.9 We remove dynamic aspects
of negotiations10 as well as issues of incomplete information, commitment problems
and many of the other aspects that have been addressed and identied as possible
reasons for resource wasteful ghting. This is for simplicity only. Our analysis is
not meant to replace any of the explanations that have been o¤ered so far, and
evolutionarily stable strategies may be seen as supplementary to these theories rather
than replacing them.
In a simple bargaining framework decision makers who maximize their own ma-
terial payo¤s compare their own material payo¤ from acceptance of the peaceful
settlement with their own expected material payo¤ from ghting.11 In order to set-
8See also Garnham (1976), Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Siverson and Sullivan (1983) for further
discussions and empirical assessments as well as Wagner (1994) for considerations of military conict
accompanying and inuencing the process of bargaining.
9Before evolutionary explanations for decision rules about peaceful settlement or military conict
between nation states are applied, it is important to discuss whether or to what extent decisions by
countries or by country leaders or governments are shaped by evolutionary forces. There is a small
literature that argues that such evolutionary forces may play a role. Wagener (2013), for instance,
suggests that procedures such as yardstick competition or imitation behavior on successful policy
making may shape political institutions and internal decision procedures, some of which are also
relevant for negotiations and decisions in international politics.
10Dynamics are important for understanding and explaining the duration of war and the relation-
ship between duration, the cost of war, considerations of discounting. See, for instance, Wittman
(1979), Werner (1998) and Wagner (2009) and Maoz and Siverson (2008) for a survey.
11Depending on how they reached this decision stage, the decision about peaceful sharing may
be the decision about ending an ongoing war. It may also be the decision which players make in a
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tle peacefully, if one of the contestants has a higher expected payo¤ in the ghting
regime than the other due to, for instance, a higher military strength or a lower cost
of ghting, this contestant requires a higher payo¤ in case of a peaceful settlement in
order to nd such a settlement attractive; the converse applies for the other contes-
tant. In fact, this is the underlying logic of bargaining models of war. As Wittman
(1979, p.751) puts it: "War and peace are substitute methods of achieving an end. If
one side is more likely to win at war, its peaceful demands increase; but at the same
time the other sides peaceful demands decrease." Hence, peaceful resource allocations
that are acceptable for both of the conicting parties take potential asymmetries of
the players in their ghting abilities or their ghting costs into account, or, more
generally speaking, asymmetries in their net payo¤s in case of war. Suppose there
are two rivals A and B who compete for a stock of resources of given size R that is
equally valuable to them. If both rivals are of equal strength (have the same costs
and success probabilities in case of a war), they may agree on a symmetric bargain-
ing outcome: Both may accept if they receive one half of the resources, and they
may prefer this outcome to military conict which is resource wasteful and, therefore,
gives both of them less than half of the resources in expectation. Given this logic,
A and B may even accept unequal sharing rules, provided that the recipient prefers
even this smaller share to the prospect of a costly war. This typically gives a whole
range of sharing rules that are acceptable to both players. A similar logic applies if
players are of unequal strength. If rival A is much stronger than rival B, then A has
a higher expected payo¤ from war than B. As long as this asymmetry is not too
strong, A and B should be willing to accept a symmetric peaceful sharing rule, given
the cost of war. The set of acceptable sharing rules shifts if players A and B become
more unequal regarding their military strength, but the basic logic of comparing own
material payo¤s in the peaceful outcome and in the ghting outcome remains the
same.
We depart from this concept and apply the concept of evolutionary stability for
small groups introduced by Scha¤er (1988).12 The theoretical analysis of evolutionary
status of peace when they decide whether or not to avoid a war that is looming in case of negotiation
failure.
12For other applications in the context of contests see Leininger (2003) and Hehenkamp, Leininger
and Possajennikov (2004). For applications to the indirect evolutionary approach as introduced by
Güth and Yaari (1992) on this problem see Eaton and Eswaran (2003) and Leininger (2009), for
implementation of the evolutionarily stable e¤orts by deated cost perceptions or low subjective
e¤ort cost see Wärneryd (2012) and for inated prize perceptions see Boudreau and Shunda (2012).
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stability has originally been shaped by the concepts introduced by Maynard Smith
and Price (1973) and Maynard Smith (1974) in evolutionary biology. This stability
concept has been derived for innitely large populations, where there is a very close
correspondence between the Nash equilibrium for players who maximize the absolute
amount of their own material payo¤ and the evolutionarily stable strategies in such
populations. However, when addressing the context of a small set of players such as
countries or sovereign states, this framework is not appropriate. Indeed, the total
number of sovereign players is nite. Moreover, conict has often been restricted to
a small area with a very limited number of players13, and an evolutionary analysis in
this context must take this small number issue into account.
Our results show that evolutionary forces with small numbers of players lead to
a di¤erent decision making. Evolutionary forces narrow down the range of possible
peaceful sharing rules which players accept. Players are willing to sacrice some
of their own material payo¤ if this improves their material payo¤ relative to the
material payo¤ of others. In other words, players are willing to choose war which
is resource wasteful and leads to a lower own material payo¤ if this choice harms
their rivals even more, compared to the choice of peaceful settlement. As we assume
that war is resource wasteful, Pareto e¢ ciency in our framework implies a peaceful
settlement. Moreover there is a non-empty set of peaceful settlements that are both
Pareto e¢ cient and Pareto improvements for both players, compared to ghting. This
set is usually referred to as the core in bargaining problems. The core is non-empty in
our framework, regardless of how asymmetric players are with respect to their military
strengths. However, not all elements in the core are possibly chosen by evolutionarily
stable strategies. The set of peaceful settlements that are acceptable to both rivals
as evolutionarily stable strategies is a proper subset of the core, and this subset is
smaller the smaller the number of players.
The key for understanding these results is as follows: The concept of evolutionary
stability in small groups brings about concerns for relative rather than absolute ma-
terial success. Players who apply a given strategy do well in the evolutionary process
if this strategy makes them more successful than players who apply other strategies.
And there are two reasons for why a given strategy makes a player better-o¤ relative
For spite and altruism in the implementation of evolutionarily stable e¤orts see Eaton, Eswaran and
Oxoby (2011) and Konrad and Morath (2012).
13The competition between Italian city states as in the Great Italian Wars in the 15th and 16th
century may serve as an example of such a geographically restricted conict area.
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to players using other strategies: First, the strategy may increase the players own
absolute payo¤. Second, the strategy may harm other players and reduce their ab-
solute payo¤. If ghting allocates more evenly what remains after a war, acceptance
of a peaceful settlement that awards a larger share of the peace dividend to the other
player may then be less attractive than to sacrice the peace dividend and ght.14
In Section 2 we describe the framework and dene evolutionary stability in this
framework borrowing from Scha¤ers (1988) denition. In Section 3 we derive our
main results. We determine an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies, compare
this equilibrium to the Nash equilibrium and derive the comparative static properties
of this comparison. Section 4 concludes.
2 The framework
We study an evolutionary context with n = 2m players in the population with m  1
being an integer. For illustration, we may think of these as the leaders or the govern-
ments of sovereign states. These players interact in a bargaining game that constitutes
the state game and that is governed by the following rules. At the beginning each
player is teamed up with one other player in a specic conict. The assignment of
players is purely random. We will study a representative pair and denote this group
by A and its members by i and  i. The group has to allocate a given prize of size 1
between i and  i. As part of the specic conict, players have an option to divide the
prize peacefully; this option allocates a share ai to player i and a share a i = 1  ai
to player  i. Each pair of players may face a di¤erent ai, as this share is drawn inde-
pendently from the same probability distribution in all groups, and the distribution
from which ai is drawn has full support [0; 1]. For instance, every prize may come in
two pieces of size ai and a i which cannot be further subdivided.
Players may accept or reject this peaceful allocation. As will be described in more
detail below, depending on the playersdecisions whether or not to accept this division
of the prize, the players in a group may share peacefully and obtain a material payo¤
of ai and a i, respectively, or they may enter into a phase in which they ght about
the full prize. If the players within a group ght, then each player chooses an e¤ort
14Note that the argument here is quite di¤erent from an argument suggesting that more belligerent
players are more successful because they expand and spread their attitudes. Frequent ghting is not
evolutionarily advantageous per se.
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(yi  0 and y i  0), measured in material units of the prize. The action yi 2 [0;1)
is the amount of material resources that player i expends in the contest if a ght
takes place in his group. The ght is described by a Tullock (1980) lottery contest.15
Player i earns the prize with a probability that depends on the players share in total
ghting e¤ort and the two playersghting strengths bi and b i = 1   bi. More
precisely, if ghting takes place, is winning probability16 is equal to
pi =
biyi
biyi + b iy i
:
Altogether, player is material payo¤ is i = ai if the players in group A share
peacefully and it is equal to
i =
biyi
biyi + b iy i
  yi (1)
if the players in group A ght. The ghting strengths bi and b i = 1   bi are as-
signed to the players in a group at the same time as the rule (ai; a i) that governs
possible peaceful sharing. We assume that, in each group, bi is an independent ran-
dom draw from a probability distribution with support on the open interval (0; 1).
The values (ai; bi) are observable. This sets the framework in which players solve the
distributional conict between them.17
An evolutionary strategy for a player i is denoted by  = ((ai; bi); y(ai; bi)) and
is dened at the stage before the players are assigned their group and learn about
the specic (ai; bi) that applies in their own group or in other groups. It consists of a
pair of actions, that is, descriptions about the players behavior as a function of the
parameters ai and bi that constitute the players environment. Apart from the e¤ort
y (ai; bi) conditional on ghting, the function (ai; bi) determines a players choice
whether to ght and is a threshold function; a threshold value  denes the smallest
peaceful share that i is willing to accept. Hence, i ghts for all ai which are smaller
than this threshold and accepts all ai which are (weakly) larger than this threshold
15This contest success function has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and has been widely
used. See Konrad (2009) for an overview of applications and microeconomic underpinnings.
16Assuming that players are risk neutral, this probability of obtaining the prize can also be inter-
preted as the share in the resources (of size one) a player appropriates in the ght.
17The restrictions of ai + a i = 1 and bi + b i = 1 are only used to simplify notation; all results
go through with minor notational changes as long as bi > 0 and b i > 0 and as long as i can observe
(ai; bi) and (a i; b i) in his group at the beginning of the state game.
7
. As it will turn out, the equilibrium threshold value for a choice of ght will be a
function of the own ghting ability bi and the ghting ability b i = 1 bi of the player
 i who is in the same group as i; hence,  =  (bi), and the function  indicates a
choice to ght if and only if ai <  (bi).
The evolutionary strategy (ai; bi) describes a players threshold  =  (bi) as
regards his ghting intentions. In addition, we need to make an assumption about
how playersghting intentions translate into whether the players in a group settle
peacefully or whether they ght: For a given (ai; bi), the comparison of ai and a i with
the thresholds  (bi) and  (b i) provides a mapping into a probability ql = q (l) where
l 2 f0; 1; 2g is the number of members of this group who choose to ght (that is, the
number of players with ai <  (bi)). Given l, the peaceful allocation is implemented
with probability 1  ql, and a ght takes place with the remaining probability ql. We
can assume for this function q (l) that, for a given (ai; bi), the following inequalities
hold: 0  q0 < q1 < q2  1. Fighting is more likely the more individuals in a group
have a threshold that is higher than the share ai and, therefore, reject the peaceful
allocation.
For a denition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (an "ESS") and a one-step
mutation, suppose that n   1 players follow a given strategy  = (E; yE) that
determines a players actions as a function of the distribution (ai; bi) in his group.18
A one-step mutation from this strategy is a pair M = (^; y^) that deviates from  in
exactly one component, either in the threshold function i or in the function y. If all
but one individual choose  and the remaining individual chooses M , we denote this
strategy prole as (M ; M). Moreover, we denote by M(M ; M) the expected
payo¤ of the player who has the mutant strategy and by (M ; M) the expected
payo¤ of the other players who follow . The "expected" in these expected payo¤s
refers to the state at the beginning of the state game, hence, before players learn
which group they are assigned to and before they learn the values of (ai; bi). Thus,
M(M ; M) takes into account that the mutant is in a group which consists of the
mutant and one other player who follows . And (M ; M) takes into consideration
that a non-mutant is in a group with the mutant with probability 1=(n  1) and in a
group without a mutant with the remaining probability (n  2)=(n  1), and that he
is assigned any of the types with equal probability. Building on Scha¤er (1988), we
18As we will see in the next section, a players equilibrium ghting e¤ort conditional on ghting
only depends on bi and b i but not on ai.
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dene:
Denition 1 The strategy  is an evolutionarily stable strategy if there is no one-step
mutation M from  such that M(M ; M)  (M ; M) > 0.
This denition highlights the role of relative, rather than absolute material payo¤.
Behind this denition, though it is not spelled out explicitly, is a theory of population
dynamics for which we can only provide an intuition here. Suppose there is an innite
sequence of state games, just as the one described above, with the same population
size in each state game. Suppose further that the composition of types(dened by
the evolutionary strategy they apply) in the population of stage t is a function of the
composition of types in the previous stage game and of the performance of these
types in this previous stage. If players of type M , that is, players who are conditioned
to apply the mutant strategy M , have a higher expected material reward than players
who apply the actions determined by strategy , where all others also apply strategy
, then the players applying M do systematically better than other players. If being
better-o¤ than others in terms of material payo¤ translates in a higher survival or
reproduction rate, then the population of players using M is likely to grow from
state game t  1 to state game t, and the population of players who apply  is likely
to shrink. This is what it means for strategy  to be not evolutionarily stable; it is
vulnerable due to the existence of strategy M . Only if there is no strategy M that
makes  vulnerable in this sense, then a population of players applying  cannot be
invaded by a mutant. As discussed in the introduction and in more detail by Wagener
(2013), applied to sovereign states, the growth or decline of certain decision rules need
not be seen as the result of extinction or reproductive success in a biological sense.
We may, for instance, consider strategies such as  as the outcome of a process in
which governments or country leaders imitate the behavior of governments or leaders
of other countries who generated a higher material payo¤. A government with some
given decision rules spreads if this type of government has imitators; that is, if other
governments give up their old decision rules and adopt the decision rules of this
government.
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3 Stable peaceful allocations
Using Denition 1, we can now characterize an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable
strategies. This leads to our main result:
Proposition 1 For nite m  1, there is an equilibrium in evolutionarily stable
strategies where
E(bi) = bi
1 + (n  2) bi
n  1 (2)
such that player i accepts the peaceful division if and only if ai  E(bi) and
yE (bi) =
n
n  1bi(1  bi):
Proof. First we show that the evolutionarily stable ghting e¤ort yE is the same for
both players i and  i and equal to
yE =
n
n  1bi(1  bi): (3)
Suppose that y i = yE as in (3). One-step deviations in yi only a¤ect the material
payo¤ of the player who is in the group with the mutant player and only if this
group ghts. Hence, one-step deviations in yi do not increase a players tness if yE
maximizes
biyi
biyi + (1  bi)yE   yi

  1
n  1

(1  bi)yE
biyi + (1  bi)yE   y
E

  n  2
n  1(): (4)
The rst term in brackets is is material payo¤ of i as a function of yi and the second
term in brackets is the material payo¤ of the player  i who is in the same group as
i, both conditional on ghting. The term () is the (expected) material payo¤ of
all other players who are not in the same group with i but all follow the candidate
evolutionarily stable strategy. Maximization of (4) with respect to yi yields the rst
order condition
n
n  1
bi(1  bi)yE
(biyi + (1  bi)yE)2
= 1
10
which is solved for yi = yE and yields (3).19 Hence, one-step deviations from the
e¤ort yE do not increase a players tness.
Using (3), we can compute a players material payo¤ in the equilibrium with
evolutionarily stable strategies conditional on ghting. Since in a monomorphic equi-
librium in evolutionarily stable strategies, yi = y i = yE, player i wins the prize with
probability
pi = bi
in case of ghting and hence gets an expected material payo¤ of pi   yE in case of a
ght which is equal to
(n  1) bi   nbi(1  bi)
n  1 =
nb2i   bi
n  1 . (5)
Now turn to the choice of the threshold for ghting. In the candidate evolutionarily
stable strategy, player i chooses the peaceful settlement if and only if
ai  E = bi1 + (n  2) bi
n  1 :
We need to show that this candidate choice fullls Scha¤ers criterion. Suppose that
all other players follow strategy . Consider the tness of player i depending on this
players threshold function ^. We ask which ^ maximizes is tness. Suppose that,
if i chooses to ght, the probability that a ght takes place inside is group increases
from ql to ql+1. For any given (ai; bi), if player i chooses to ght rather than the
peaceful settlement, this changes is tness for this assignment of shares by
(ql+1   ql)
"
nb2i   bi
n  1  
1
n  1
n (1  bi)2   (1  bi)
n  1  
n  2
n  1()
#
+((1  ql+1)  (1  ql))

ai   1
n  1 (1  ai) 
n  2
n  1()

: (6)
The term in square brackets in the rst line is is relative expected material payo¤ if
ght takes place in is group: The expected material payo¤s of the two players who
ght are as in (5), and all (n  2) players who are not in the same group as i get an
expected material payo¤ of (). The term in square brackets in the second line is
19Since the objective function is strictly concave, the rst order condition is su¢ cient in deter-
mining the optimal choice of yi.
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is relative material payo¤ in case no ghting takes place in is group: Player i gets a
share ai and the other player in his group gets a i = 1  ai; all other (n  2) players
again get an expected material payo¤ of ().
With (6), player is tness does not increase in case i chooses to ght if and only
if
(ql+1   ql)

(n  1) b2i   bi(1  bi)
(n  1)  
1
n  1
(n  1) (1  bi)2   bi(1  bi)
(n  1)

  (ql+1   ql)

ai   1
n  1 (1  ai)

 0:
Solving this inequality for ai yields a critical level of ai such that is tness is higher
in case i ghts if and only if ai falls short of this critical level. This critical level
denes the optimal threshold as
E(bi) = bi
1 + (n  2) bi
n  1 :
Note that, unlike the evolutionarily stable e¤ort, E(bi) = E(b i) if and only if
bi = b i. The choice of cut-o¤ rule E maximizes a players tness ex-ante, i.e., prior
to the matching in pairs and to the assignment of sharing o¤ers ai and ghting powers
bi.
In the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies, a player chooses to ght
whenever his peaceful resource share is too small (smaller than E(bi)), for which
ghting increases is relative material payo¤ (i.e., his tness). Thus, relevant for the
decision whether to ght is the own and the other playersexpected material payo¤
in case a ght takes place. Since a players material payo¤ conditional on ghting
depends on his relative ghting strength, the same holds for the cut-o¤ value E.
Corollary 1
(i) E(bi) > E(b i) if and only if bi > b i, that is, the stronger player requests a
higher share.
(ii) If n = 2, then E(bi) = bi, that is, the requested share is equal to the players
equilibrium winning probability pi = bi conditional on ghting.
The stronger a player is relative to the other player in his group, the larger will
be the share of resources that this player demands and that guarantees that a peace-
ful agreement can be reached (Corollary 1(i)). If the players within a group are
12
su¢ ciently asymmetric in terms of their ghting strength, the peaceful contracts
(ai; a i) that are accepted in the equilibrium require an asymmetric distribution of
the resources. Moreover, if n is small, the threshold for acceptance of the peaceful
arrangement gets closer to the individuals winning probability in case a ght takes
place. This holds despite of the fact that, in the contest, the players would also have
to bear the cost of e¤ort. In the case where n = 2, the threshold for acceptance of
the peaceful arrangement is exactly equal to the individuals winning probability in
the contest (Corollary 1(ii)). In other words, in the only peaceful contract that is
evolutionarily stable, the individualsresource shares are equal to their prospective
winning probabilities in case of a ght:
 
E(bi); 
E(b i)

= (bi; b i). Hence, if n = 2,
the only peaceful contract that is sustainable in the evolutionarily stable equilibrium
allocates resource shares to the players that exactly reect the balance of power.
In what follows, we compare the evolutionarily stable strategy
 
E; yE

with the
choices that emerge if all players maximize their absolute material payo¤. For this
purpose, consider the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a two-stage game: Once
players are allocated to their groups and learned the (ai; bi) that applies in their
group, players simultaneously choose whether to accept or reject the possible peace-
ful sharing arrangement. This choice constitutes stage 1 in a two-stage game. Let
l 2 f0; 1; 2g be the number of players in a group who have chosen to ght. As a con-
sequence of these choices, the players in a group share peacefully with a probability
of 1   q (l), in which case the game ends and the players obtain the resource shares
ai and a i = 1  ai. A ght takes place with the complementary probability q (l); in
this case the players in this group simultaneously choose their ghting e¤orts yi and
y i (measured in material units of the prize) in stage 2 of the game. As before, player
is winning probability in the contest is equal to (biyi) = (biyi + b iy i).
Proposition 2 For given (ai; bi), in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, player i
accepts the peaceful division if and only if ai  N(bi) where
N (bi) = b
2
i : (7)
Proof. First consider is expected payo¤ conditional on ghting. Solving the game
by backward induction, in stage 2, players maximize their expected material payo¤
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which is equal to
biyi
biyi + b iy i
  yi:
As is known from the literature on contests, this yields equilibrium e¤ort choices that
are equal to yi = y i = yN where
yN = bi(1  bi). (8)
Since yi = y i = yN , player is equilibrium winning probability is equal to
pNi = bi; (9)
and his expected material payo¤ from ghting is equal to pNi   yN or, equivalently,
Ni = b
2
i : (10)
In stage 1, i strictly prefers to ght if and only his continuation payo¤ in stage 2 (as
in (10)) is strictly larger than what he would get in case of peace. Therefore, player
i rejects the peaceful sharing opportunity if and only if ai < b2i .
The results in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 allow for a comparison of players
evolutionarily stable behavior and their Nash equilibrium behavior as regards the
peaceful sharing option.
Corollary 2 The threshold N (bi) that player i chooses in the Nash equilibrium is
smaller than the threshold E (bi) that constitutes the evolutionarily stable strategy.
Proof. For a proof we compare the cut-o¤N (bi) in the Nash equilibrium to the cut-
o¤ E (bi) that players choose in the equilibrium in evolutionarily stable strategies.
Since
bi
1 + (n  2) bi
n  1 > bi
bi + (n  2) bi
n  1 = b
2
i ;
we have E (bi) > N (bi).
The main result of Corollary 2 is that the cut-o¤value E (bi) in the evolutionarily
stable equilibrium is strictly larger than the cut-o¤ value N (bi) in the subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium. If the cut-o¤ value is determined by what is an evolutionarily
stable strategy, then the player is more demanding in a given situation than a player
who maximizes his absolute material payo¤ and interacts with players who do the
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same in a Nash equilibrium. This holds for all nite populations, i.e., for all nite
m > 0. In other words, the range

0; E (bi)

where player i rejects the peaceful shar-
ing opportunity and prefers to ght in the evolutionarily stable equilibrium is larger
than the corresponding range that results from the maximization of own material
payo¤s. Playersstable evolutionary strategies make them reject peaceful allocations
that give them a higher payo¤ than what they would get if they ght. This holds
despite of the fact that the evolutionarily stable ghting e¤ort y is higher than the
ghting e¤ort that maximizes the material payo¤ (yE > yN), that is, even though
there is higher rent dissipation in the evolutionarily stable ghting outcome than in
the Nash equilibrium.
To gain some intuition for this result, consider the case where all players have
the same ghting strength, bi = b i = 1=2. In this case, players choose to ght
in the Nash equilibrium whenever their peaceful share is smaller than N = 1=4.
The evolutionarily stable strategy, however, is not to accept peaceful shares below
E = (1=4) (n= (n  1)) > 1=4. If a player i decides to ght, this has two e¤ects on
is tness. First, since ghting reduces is absolute material payo¤, it also reduces
is payo¤ relative to players who are not in the same group and whose payo¤s are
not a¤ected by is decision to ght. Second, ghting also reduces the payo¤ of the
player  i who is in the same group as i, and hence increases is tness (relative to
 i). The smaller n, the more important is this second e¤ect. In case of n = 2, i
will not accept any resource share that is smaller than the resource share of  i (i.e.,
E = 0:5) because ghting will restore equality of payo¤s of the two players. On the
other hand, a larger n causes the direct comparison with  i to be less important for
is overall tness. By rejecting the peaceful sharing with  i the player can reduce
only the tness of  i, but there are many other players whose tness i cannot a¤ect.
Hence, E is decreasing in n.
Figure 1 illustrates the deviation of E from N for the case of bi = b i as
a function of n. It shows that there is a range of possible sharing arrangements
that are accepted by players in the Nash equilibrium but rejected in the context of
evolutionarily stable strategies. This range narrows with an increase in the number of
players n. As is well known, for n ! 1 the evolutionarily stable strategies coincide
with the strategies that constitute a Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 1: The evolutionarily stable threshold for ghting (example for the case of
bi = b i).
Figure 2: Peaceful resource allocations in the Nash equilibrium and in the equilibrium
in evolutionarily stable equilibrium (example for the case of bi = 2=3, b i = 1=3, and
n = 4).
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Figure 2 illustrates the role of asymmetric strength. Here, the thresholds for choices
of peace are shown for the Nash equilibrium (N (bi) and N (b i)) and for the equilib-
rium in evolutionarily stable strategies (E (bi) and E (b i)), for the case of bi = 2=3,
b i = 1=3, and n = 4. The shaded areas correspond to the set of resource alloca-
tions that avoid ghting. All peaceful contracts that divide the prize of size one lie
on the "budget constraint" a i = 1   ai. The set of peacefully sustainable resource
allocations is shifted towards the stronger player i. While in the Nash equilibrium a
symmetric distribution of the resources avoids ghting in this example, it is evolu-
tionarily stable for the stronger player not to accept such a symmetric distribution
but to demand a larger share of the resources.
4 Conclusions
The theory result derived in this paper provides a possible explanation for violence
in an environment in which peaceful settlement would be feasible and in situations
in which the choice of peaceful settlement would be the individually optimal strategy
for players who maximize their own material payo¤s. The result has implications for
explaining the emergence of violent conict. If the playersstrategies are shaped by
evolutionary forces, this predicts that players who choose whether to settle peacefully
or to ght frequently choose to ght even if this reduces their own material payo¤.
Consequently, the range of peaceful resource allocations that is evolutionarily stable
is smaller than the corresponding range in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
The balance of power has implications for the feasible resource allocations that
can avoid the emergence of conict. Players reject resource allocations that do not
coincide with the relative ghting strengths in a conict. In other words, the threshold
for their resource share below which players reject peaceful allocations is a function
of the prospective success probability in a conict. If, however, bargaining outcomes
reect potential imbalances of power, such imbalances do not make violent conict
more likely.
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